An Automated Formal Process for Detecting Fault Injection Vulnerabilities in Binaries and Case Study on PRESENT -- Extended Version by Given-Wilson, Thomas et al.
HAL Id: hal-01400283
https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01400283v2
Preprint submitted on 4 Apr 2017
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
An Automated Formal Process for Detecting Fault
Injection Vulnerabilities in Binaries and Case Study on
PRESENT – Extended Version
Thomas Given-Wilson, Nisrine Jafri, Jean-Louis Lanet, Axel Legay
To cite this version:
Thomas Given-Wilson, Nisrine Jafri, Jean-Louis Lanet, Axel Legay. An Automated Formal Process
for Detecting Fault Injection Vulnerabilities in Binaries and Case Study on PRESENT – Extended
Version. 2017. ￿hal-01400283v2￿
An Automated Formal Process for Detecting
Fault Injection Vulnerabilities in Binaries
and Case Study on PRESENT – Extended Version
Thomas Given-Wilson, Nisrine Jafri, Jean-Louis Lanet, and Axel Legay
Inria
Rennes, France
Email: {thomas.given-wilson, nisrine.jafri, jean-louis.lanet, axel.legay}@inria.fr
Abstract—Recently fault injection has increasingly been
used both to attack software applications, and to test
system robustness. Detecting fault injection vulnerabilities
has been approached with a variety of different but limited
methods. This paper proposes a general process without
these limitations that uses model checking to detect fault
injection vulnerabilities in binaries. The efficacy of this
process is demonstrated by detecting vulnerabilities in the
PRESENT binary.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently fault injection has been increasingly used
both as a method to attack software applications, and to
test the robustness of software systems. Many systems
are particularly vulnerable to fault injection attacks due
to operating in hostile environments, i.e. environments
where an attacker may be able to perform physical
attacks on the system hardware. Many such attacks have
been demonstrated on a variety of systems, showing that
different kinds of faults can be injected into various de-
vices [1], [2], [3]. Attacks can also be achieved through
software alone and do not require attacking the hardware
directly. One recent example of this is the row hammer
attack [4] that has been exploited to perform various
attacks [5], [6].
The wide variety of fault injection attacks and possible
impacts upon a system make it impossible to prevent
software from failing under all possible attacks [3].
Thus, recent work has approached the problem of fault
injection by limiting the scope of attacks, or limiting the
kinds of vulnerabilities analysed [7], [8], [9], [10], often
requiring specialed equipment.
This paper proposes an automated formal process
for the detection of fault injection vulnerabilities in
binaries. In particular, a process that can account for
many different kinds of fault injections and that does
not require extensive hardware or specialised equipment.
This process is achieved by simulating fault injection at-
tacks upon the executable binary for the given software,
and then using model checking to determine whether or
not the simulated fault injection attack violates properties
the software should maintain.
This paper presents an automated process for detect-
ing vulnerabilities in binaries using model checking.
The process begins with the executable binary that
represents the program to be considered. The valida-
tion of the binary involves checking various properties
using model checking to ensure the binary meets its
specification. Fault injection attacks are then simulated
on the executable binary, producing mutant binaries.
The properties are then model checked on the mutant
binaries. A difference in the result between validating
and checking the properties indicates a vulnerability to
the fault injection attack that was simulated.
This process provides a general approach that can
support detecting a wide variety of fault injection vul-
nerabilities in binaries by varying the fault model of the
fault injection. The strengths of this approach include
the following. By operating directly upon the binary,
fault injection vulnerabilities that cannot be detected in
source languages or intermediate representations can be
detected [11]. Formal methods, here model checking,
ensure the rigour of the analysis and so ensure that fault
injection vulnerabilities that are detected are real and not
false positives. An automated process can easy to iterate
over various fault injection models and approaches, and
also allows broad, or even complete, coverage of possible
fault injection attacks. Combining automation, broad
coverage, and formal methods, allows the process to
make strong guarantees about the vulnerability of a
system that has been analysed.
To demonstrate the efficacy of this process, this paper
includes a case study of applying the process to the
PRESENT encryption algorithm [12], [13] with various
fault models. PRESENT is a lightweight encryption
algorithm designed to be used on embedded devices, thus
making it an ideal choice to consider security critical
software in hostile environments. The process proposed
here was applied to the PRESENT binary with five
different fault models for a total of approximately 5700
experiments. These fault injections yielded a number
of infinite loops, and crashes, but also 9 vulnerabilities
where the encryption algorithm is completely bypassed.
The key contributions of this paper are as follows.
• Describing a general process that allows automated
detection of fault injection vulnerabilities in bina-
ries.
• An implementation of the process that allows easy
automation with existing tools.
• A case study demonstrating the efficacy of using
the process on the PRESENT algorithm.
• The identification of 9 fault injection vulnerabilities
in the PRESENT algorithm that bypass encryption.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II
presents a simple motivating example that is used to
clearly demonstrate the techniques. Section III recalls
background on fault injection attacks, model checking,
properties, and PRESENT. Section IV details the pro-
cess proposed in this paper. Section V discusses the
implementation and tools used to achieve the process.
Section VI presents illustrative results for the moti-
vational example. Section VII applies the process to
the PRESENT algorithm with five fault models and
analyses the results. Section VIII discusses related work.
Section IX concludes and discusses future work.
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
This section presents a motivating example that is
used to: illustrate the concepts and process, and for
the experimental results of this paper. The example is
of code that checks a PIN supplied by a user when
authenticating to use a credit card.
Consider the code in Figure 1 that checks the value of
a candidate PIN entered by a user when authenticating
to use a credit card. Prior to this code fragment the true
PIN PINTrue is assumed to be defined and intialised
with the true PIN value. Similarly the candidate PIN
PINCandidate is defined and initialised with a value
input by the user. Further, both PINs are checked to be
the same length and this length is defined to be their
size PINSize. The first three lines initialise variables
to be used in the code fragment shown here. The
grantAccess variable is used to indicate whether
1bool grantAccess = false;
2bool badValue = false;
3int i = 0;
4while (i < PINSize) {
5if (PINCandidate[i] != PINTrue[i]) {
6badValue = true;
7}
8i++;
9}
10if (badValue == false) {
11grantAccess = true;
12}
Fig. 1: Motivating Example Code
or not to grant access after checking the candidate
PIN against the true PIN, intialised to false. The
badValue variable is used to detect when digits of the
two PINs do not match, also intialised to false. The
variable i is used as a an iterator to progress through
the digits of the PINs, intialised to 0. The next six lines
of the code are a loop that iterates through the digits of
the candidate PIN and true PIN, incrementing i on line
eight, and bounded by the PIN size PINSize. Line five
checks the ith digit of the candidate PIN against the ith
digit of the true PIN. On line six, if the digits differ, then
badValue is set to true to indicate that (at least one)
digit of the two PINs are not equal. At the end, on line
ten the conditional checks that no bad values have been
found, and grants access if this is the case.
Now consider when PINSize = 4. By changing
a single bit, an attacker could change the value of
PINSize from 4 to 0. (This succeeds since 4 =
0...0100 in binary, and changing the 1 to 0 yields
0...0000.) Observe that this would bypass the loop
since i < PINSize (i.e. 0 < 0) would not hold, and
therefore the checking of any digits of the candidate PIN.
Thus, the example is vulnerable to this kind of 1-bit fault
injection attack (as well as several others that will be
introduced later).
The above paragraph describes a fault that can be
injected into the executable binary that would allow the
attacker to gain access even without the correct PIN.
This paper proposes and explains a process that can be
used to detect such fault injection vulnerabilities (Sec-
tion IV). An implementation of the process is detailed
in Section V, and this implementation is used to obtain
the experimental results (Section VI). The motivating
example is used as the basis for the experimental re-
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sults, including detecting the fault injection vulnerability
described above.
III. BACKGROUND
This section recalls key concepts and information
useful to understanding the rest of the paper. These
are divided into four main areas: fault injection, model
checking, properties, and the PRESENT algorithm.
A. Fault Injection
Fault injection can be considered as an attack, when
an attacker targets the hardware of a system to create
an exploitable error at the software level. The goal
of such an attack is to cause a specific effect at the
hardware level, that in turn creates an exploitable change
in the software behaviour. The rest of this section recalls
key points regarding the kinds of fault injection attacks
considered here.
The hardware effect of a fault injection attack is
described through a fault model that specifies the nature
and scope of the induced modification. Typically such
attacks are achieved by changing a value stored in the
hardware, such as changing the value of a whole byte
[3]. Such hardware effects generally focus on the kind
of fault that can be created rather than the effect this has
on the software.
Simulating fault injection attacks in an experimental
environment can be done in two ways: reproducing
the attack on the hardware, or simulating the attack
with software. Reproducing the attack using hardware
technology is relatively difficult and expensive, since
specialised hardware must be used to inject the fault
(e.g. using a laser [7], or electromagnetic pulse [8]).
Comparatively, simulating with software is easy and
cheap because this requires only modification to the
executable binary and no specialised hardware. Since the
goal in this paper is to develop an efficient process that
can be implemented with a software tool chain, the rest
of this paper will only consider software simulations.
Software simulation attacks can also be classified into
two kinds of fault injection attacks, run time and compile
time. Run time fault injection attacks are those that occur
only while the code being attacked is being executed.
Compile time fault injection attacks are those that occur
at any time starting form compilation of the code, and up
until just prior to execution. This paper considers only
compile time fault injection attacks since this captures
many run time faults as well and also builds towards
future work (see Section IX-A).
B. Model checking
Model checking is a formal method for determining
whether properties hold on a model [14]. Model check-
ing has the advantage that all possible states of the model
are considered, and so is guaranteed to be able to answer
whether or not a property holds for a given model.
The model is a representation of the program or
system being considered. A good model is able to
represent all the possible states and transitions that the
program can achieve. In this work, the model represents
an executable binary program.
The cost of model checking comes in the potential
exponential complexity used to consider all the possibly
infinite states of a model. However, for limited models,
model checking is highly efficient and precise. Further,
various approaches have been used to make model
checking efficient even for large and complex models
(or programs) [15].
Bounded model checking is a refinement of model
checking that alleviates some of the issues with possibly
infinite complexity by bounding the checking [16]. The
key idea in bounded model checking is to put a bound
on parts of the model that could be infinite (or at least
extremely large). For example, checking a program with
a loop, going through hundreds or millions of iterations
could be very costly for model checking. However,
bounded model checking of such an example could limit
the number of times to iterate through a loop. Thus,
bounded model checking allows limits to be placed upon
such potentially unbounded aspects of model checking.
C. Properties
To perform model checking requires specifying the
properties to be checked upon the model. There are two
main kinds of properties that can be checked safety,
and liveness [14]. Safety properties are used to express
that certain propositions hold when they are encountered.
Liveness properties express that propositions hold over
some temporal dimension. This paper only considers
safety properties since these are clearer, more intuitive
to represent, and sufficient to illustrate the feasibility of
the process. Liveness properties can also be checked
in a similar manner, although this is not presented
in this paper, for further details see the discussion in
Section IX-A.
Safety properties can be expressed by simple propo-
sitions that can be annotated into the code of the
program being considered. Generally such properties
support: negation, equality, inequality, conjunction, and
disjunction. These can be defined upon values or states
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and values within the model (and thus the binary being
checked).
D. The PRESENT Algorithm
PRESENT [12], [13] is a lightweight block ci-
pher designed for use on low power and CPU con-
strained devices. The PRESENT algorithm consists of
31 rounds of a Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN)
with block size of 64 bits. The canonical implementation
of PRESENT1 supports key lengths of 80 or 128 bits.
The core encryption algorithm is the same for both 80
and 128 bit keys.
The version of PRESENT analysed here is the canon-
ical version in C for 32 bit architectures (size optimised,
80 bit key) with minor modifications to change loop
types (due to limitations in the tools used, see Sec-
tion IX-A for further discussion of these).
IV. PROCESS
This section details the process presented in this paper
for detecting fault injection vulnerability in binaries.
An overview of the process is as follows (and shown in
Figure 2). Prior to starting the process, the source code,
and the properties represented by annotations within
the source code, must be defined. The preparation step
for the process is then to compile the source code
and properties to produce an executable binary in a
manner that preserves the properties as annotations. The
properties are validated to hold on the executable binary
using model checking. The executable binary is then
injected with simulated faults to produce mutant binaries.
The properties are then checked upon the mutant binaries
again using model checking. A difference in the results
of validation and checking the properties indicates a
1Available at http://www.lightweightcrypto.org/implementations.php
vulnerability to the simulated fault injection. The rest
of this section details this process.
The choice to start the preparation with the source
code and not the binary is made for illustrative clarity
and ease of use for the software developer, since defining
properties over binaries is more arduous. However, most
aspects of the process do not rely upon this choice, and
future work is to be able to start directly from the binary
(further discussion in Section IX-A)
Since this paper considers fault injection attacks upon
the binary it is necessary to compile the source code
(and here properties) into an executable binary. This
executable binary represents the software application that
would be executed by the system in practice. Thus to
simulate fault injection attacks on the actual system,
the executable binary must be used in the simulation.
For the process here the compilation must maintain
the properties, and so compilation must maintain the
properties as annotations in the executable binary.
The properties are validated to hold upon the exe-
cutable binary using model checking. This is done to
ensure that the executable binary does indeed meet the
specification of the properties. If there is some other error
in the source code or compilation, this can be detected
here and not be (incorrectly) attributed to fault injection
vulnerability.
Next is the simulation of the fault injection on the exe-
cutable binary to produce mutant binaries. This simulates
the actual fault injection attacks and produces mutant
executable binaries that represents the executable binary
after the attacks have been effected.
Lastly, the validation results from model checking the
executable binary are compared with the checking results
from model checking each mutant binary. Differences
here indicate that the fault that was injected yields a
change in behaviour that violates the properties, and so
could be exploited by an attacker.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
This section presents the implementation of the pro-
cess from the previous section. The implementation here
exploits currently available tools where possible, despite
some having significant limitations. This choice was
made in order to focus upon a simple and feasible
implementation of the process. For discussion of the
limitations of the tools used in the implementation here,
please refer to Section IX-A.
The presentation here is highly detailed to allow easy
reproduction. This choice was made to maximise clarity
and opportunity for others to implement the process for
themselves and conduct their own experiments. The rest
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of the section explicitly details how to implement the
process with the chosen tools.
An overview of the implementation is as follows, and
shown in Figure 3. The implementation begins with the
source code written in the C language and the properties
represented in the source code by assert statements.
The source code and properties are compiled to an
executable binary by the GNU C Compiler (GCC) [17].
The executable binary (including the properties con-
tained within) is transformed into an intermediate rep-
resentation in Low Level Virtual Machine Intermediate
Language (LLVM-IR) by the Machine Code Semantics
(MC-Sema) tool [18]. The properties are then checked
on the intermediate representation using the Low Level
Bounded Model Checker (LLBMC) [19], [20]. The exe-
cutable binary is manually edited to produce the mutant
binary file according to the fault model chosen. The
steps to model check the properties on the executable
binary are then repeated for the mutant binary. Finally,
the results of model checking the executable binary and
the mutant binary are compared for differences. The rest
of this section details this implementation.
A. Source Code & Properties
The implementation starts with the source code written
in the C language, including the properties to be vali-
dated and checked that are expressed as assert statements
in this source code. For example, the source code of
the motivating example (see Section II) could have the
following property (recalled from Section III-C)
__llbmc_assert(i == 4);
that the loop counter i reaches 4 inserted between lines
9 and 10. This would check that i reaches the value
4 before doing the conditional to test whether access
should be granted on lines 10− 12.
B. Compilation
The compilation from source code to executable bi-
nary for this paper is done with GCC. Note that here a
listings file is also generated with annotations that will be
exploited to do the fault injection later. The following is
the command used to compile with GCC for this paper.
$gcc -m32 -ggdb -c -Wa,-a,-ad -o test.o
test.c > test.lst
Here -m32 specifies compiling for 32-bit architecture.
The -ggdb argument includes debugging information
that will be used to help translate the intermediate
language later in the implementation. The -c argument
indicates to compile and assemble the source code, but
do not link (this simplifies the scope of checking since no
library code is linked at this stage). The -Wa,-a,-ad
argument specifies annotations to output that will be
used later to do the fault injection (-a to turn the
listing on, -ad to omit unnecessary debug information).
The -o is used to specify the output file (text.o)
for the executable binary. Here test.c is the source
file with properties. Lastly, > test.lst outputs the
annotations used later to do the fault injection into the
file test.lst.
Note that the above command preserves the assert
statements along with the debugging information, so
these can be exploited in later stages.
C. Intermediate Representation
The translation from executable binary to LLVM-IR
is done by MC-Sema in two stages. The first stage uses
the executable binary to generate a Control Flow Graph
(CFG). The second stage uses the CFG to generate the
LLVM-IR.
Executable Binary to CFG: The first stage is done
by the bin_descend tool (included within MC-Sema)
using the below command.
$bin_descend -march=x86 -d
5
-func-map="test_map.txt"
-entry-symbol=checkPIN -i=test.o
Here the -march=x86 argument specifies X86 ar-
chitecture. The -d flag enables output of debugging
information, used in later stages of the implementation.
The -func-map=
"test_map.txt" argument informs of the file
(test_map.txt) that contains specifications of exter-
nally referenced functions (e.g. __llbmc_assert 1
C N to indicate that the function __llbmc_assert
has 1 argument, C to represent the calling convention
here is for CleanUp to clean up the stack after the func-
tion call, the N to mention that the function has a return).
The -entry-symbol=checkPIN argument indicates
the function name of the entry point into the code, here
the checkPIN function. Lastly, -i=test.o indicates
to input from the file test.o.
CFG to LLVM-IR: The second stage is to translate the
CFG to LLVM-IR. This is done by the cfg_to_llvm
tool also included in MC-Sema. The command to achieve
this is shown below.
$cfg_to_bc -mtriple=i686-pc-linux-gnu
-driver=test_entry,checkPIN,0,return,C
-o test.bc -i test.cfg
Again -mtriple=i686-pc-linux-gnu
indicates the X86 architecture (on linux).
The argument -driver=test_entry,
checkPIN,0,return,C defines the entry point
in the generated LLVM-IR to be test_entry and
this should correspond to the entry point symbol
checkPIN in the CFG, the 0 represent the argument
count, the return to specify that the function has
a return, and finally the C represents the calling
convention. As usual -o indicates the output file name
(here test.bc). Lastly, -i is the input file name (here
test.cfg).
D. Model Checking
The model checking of properties on the intermediate
representation is done by LLBMC. The command used
here to model check with LLBMC is as below.
$llbmc -function-name=test_entry
--ignore-missing-function-bodies
--max-loop-iterations=20
-only-custom-assertions test.bc
The argument -function-name=test_entry
makes certain that LLBMC checks the
specified function (and not others). The
--ignore-missing-function-bodies
argument is used to ignore missing functions,
such as those that were not linked and so
Result:
=======
No error detected.
Fig. 4: Property 1 : executable binary verification result
do not appear in the LLVM-IR. The argument
--max-loop-iterations=20 specifies bounds for
the model checking, here limited to 20 loop iterations.
The -only-custom-assertions argument forces
LLBMC to only check the properties specified, and not
other default properties. Lastly, test.bc is the input
file.
Note that the above steps from executable binary
to model checking can be repeated (with changed file
names) for the mutant binary, and so will not be repeated
below.
E. Fault Injection
The fault injection attack that takes an executable
binary and yields a mutant binary is done by manually
editing the file. To achieve this the listing file generated
by GCC during compilation is exploited to find which
locations in the executable binary correspond to the
source code, and thus easily understand the semantics so
as to be able to simulate specific fault injection attacks.
Once the locations can be found with the listing, the
binary can be modified using any binary editing tool
and the modified one saved as the mutant binary.
F. Detecting Vulnerability
Once the results of model checking have been pro-
duced for both the executable binary and the mutant
binary, fault injection vulnerabilities can be detected
when these results differ. In Figure 4 the output of
LLBMC is shown for when all the properties hold.
By contrast Figure 5 shows the LLBMC output when
a property is violated. Note that due to compilation
to binary and then translation to LLVM-IR, LLBMC
is unable to gather sufficient information to produce a
useful trace of the property violation.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section presents experimental results obtained
by applying the process using the implementation. For
clarity, all the attacks and properties presented here use
the motivating example (of Section II). The experimental
results show that by using the process presented here
(and the implementation detailed in Section V) a variety
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Result:
=======
Error detected.
Error synopsis:
===============
Assertion failed: Custom assertion (
assert or __llbmc_assert) does not
hold.
Error location:
===============
Error occurs in basic block "
block_0x10b" of function "sub_0".
No debug information available.
Stack trace:
============
#0 void @sub_0(%struct.regs* %0)
#1 i32 @demo_entry()
Fig. 5: Property 1 : mutant binary verification result
of fault injection vulnerabilities can be detected. The rest
of this section presents illustrative 1-bit fault injection
attack examples building to the general solution that
can detect many kinds of fault injection attacks, and
concludes with a variety of different kinds of fault
injection attacks to illustrate generality of the process
and implementation.
Attack 1: The first attack to consider is the attack de-
tailed in Section II where changing a single bit changes
the PINSize variable from 4 to 0. Recall that since the
loop that checks the digits of the PINs iterates from i
= 0 to i < PINSize, that the loop will be skipped
(since 0 < 0 does not hold). This fault injection attack
can be exploited by the attacker since the PINs are never
checked against each other. Therefore, any candidate PIN
will lead to access being granted, and so the attacker can
use this fault injection attack to gain access (even when
the candidate PIN they supply does not match the true
PIN).
Property A: A simple property to detect such an
attack would be to ensure that i reaches 4. This can
be achieved by taking the following property (recalled
from Section III-C):
__llbmc_assert(i == 4);
inserted between lines 9 and 10.
With this property added to the source code the
process was repeated with attack 1. The results of model
checking the mutant binary reveal that the assertion was
violated and thus the model checking result different
form the validation result. Thus, vulnerability to the first
fault injection attack was detected.
Attack 2: An alternative 1-bit fault injection attack that
has the same effect as Attack 1 is to initialise the value
of the variable i to 4. This will again grant access even
when the two PINs differ since the loop will be bypassed
as before (this time since 4 < 4 does not hold). Observe
that since i is intiailised to 4 this fault injection attack
should not violate the assert statement of Property A.
This can be exploited by the attacker in the same manner
as Attack 1 to gain access with a candidate PIN that does
not match the true PIN.
The process was repeated with Attack 2 and Property
A. As expected, the fault injection vulnerability was not
detected.
Property B: The above result illustrates that the choice
of properties need to consider the behaviour of the
program rather than focus on particular variables that are
incidental to the program’s execution. Thus, a property
that captures the idea that unequal PINs should never
lead to access being granted could be defined as follows
(also recalled from Section III-C).
__llbmc_assert( !(PINCandidate != PINTrue)
|| grantAccess == false);
where this property is inserted into the motivating ex-
ample code after line 12. This property expresses that if
the two PINs are different then the access is not granted.
The process was then repeated for both Attack 1 & 2,
and with Property B. As expected Property B was able to
detect both fault injection vulnerabilities represented by
Attacks 1 & 2. This shows that considering the behaviour
is more important than considering the variables used to
achieve the behaviour. That is, properties should consider
PINCandidate, PINTrue, and grantAcces rather
than i or badValue.
Attack 3: Observe that Property B detects attacks that
allow access when the PINs are not equal, but does not
consider when the PINs are equal. An alternative attack
could be to deny access even to a user who knows the
correct PIN. Consider the 1-bit fault injection attack that
changes the value of true (represented in binary by
0...01) to false (represented in binary by 0...00).
Now consider this attack upon the motivating example
line 11, changing grantAcces = true to be
grantAccess = false;
and thus preventing any access even when the PINs are
equal.
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The process was then repeated using this new Attack
3 with Properties A & B. As expected neither property
was able to detected this attack. Property A failed since
the attack does not effect the iterator i. Property B failed
since when the PINs are equal no further behaviour is
considered.
Property C: To also account for Attack 3, the original
Property B needs to be extended to also consider the
behaviour when the PINs are equal. Indeed, the ideal
behaviour of the code can be represented by the follow-
ing property.
__llbmc_assert(
( !(PINCandidate != PINTrue)
|| grantAccess == false)
&& ( !(PINCandidate == PINTrue)
|| grantAccess == true));
This ensures that when the PINs are unequal access is
not granted, and when the PINs are equal then access is
granted. Property C is added to the motivating example
in the same place as Property B would be; after line 12.
The process was then repeated with all three Attacks
(1, 2 & 3) using Property C. As expected Property C
was able to detect all three fault injection attacks.
A. Other Attacks
This section considers several more fault injection
attacks in less detail than those above. These include
several more 1-bit fault injection attacks, and then other
kinds of attacks, culminating in an attack that can only
be effected in the binary and not in the source or by
“compiling” directly to an intermediate representation.
There are several other 1-bit fault injection attacks
that can be performed against the motivating example.
Such attacks include changing the initialisation value
of variables such as grantAccess and badValue,
e.g. at line 6 changing the initialisation badValue =
true to instead be badValue = false. These are
all detected by at least Property C, if not also Property
B.
A different kind of attack that targets the control
flow of the program is to change the target of a jump
instruction. For example, the jump from the conditional
on line 5 of the motivating example, could change from
skipping the following instruction on line 6, to always
executing line 6. Thus badValue = true (line 6)
would always be executed, regardless of the outcome of
the conditional. This can be done by modifying three bits
(or one byte) of the target (relative) address of the jump,
from 0000 0111 to 0000 0000. This attack was
successfully detected by Property C (but not Properties
A or B).
A more significant attack on the behaviour of an
instruction is to simply change the instruction to a
NOP (non-operation). Consider in the motivating ex-
ample when a fault injection changes the instruction
that represents line 6 badValue = true; to a NOP.
This requires modifying 4 bytes (on the X86 32-bit
architecture used here). The change would allow access
for any candidate PIN (by never recording differences
to badValue). This attack was successfully detected
by Properties B and C (but not Property A).
Instead of changing a subtle behaviour like a jump,
or simply wiping an instruction to a NOP, another
fault injection attack is to change the instruction type,
e.g. changing a CMP instruction to a MOV instruction.
This can be done on the CMP instruction that compares
the values PINCandidate[i] != PINTrue[i] on
line 5 of the motivating example. This requires modify-
ing 3-bits of the executable binary, from 0011 1011
to 1000 1011. The result of this change is that the
following line that sets badValue to true will always
be executed. This change prevents access even when the
correct candidate PIN is provided, similar to Attack 3. As
expected, this attack is successfully detected by Property
C (but not Properties A or B).
One attack that is of particular interest here, is an
attack that can be represented in the executable binary
but not in source code or from “compiling” the source
code to an intermediate language, such as C and LLVM-
IR, respectively. An example of this kind of attack is
the modification of the return value stored in the return
register (eax on X86 architectures). This kind of attack
can be simulated and detected using the process and
implementation here.
To properly handle this attack requires a function call,
and so the motivating example is modified by placing
the code in Section II inside a function that returns
grantAccess. The attack works by altering the re-
turned value from this new function. The return value is
stored in the eax register, for the motivating example
this is handled by the binary operation corresponding to
the assembly instruction below.
mov eax, DWORD PTR [ebp-0x8]
The attack is then to change the value loaded into eax
so that the function behaviour is changed. For example,
by changing the value 0000 1000 to 0000 1100
the returned value of grantAccess can change from
False to True, so the access will be granted even if
the two PINs are not equal. (Note that if the returned
value is already 0000 1100 then this can be ignored,
or the value changed to 0000 1000 inverting the
function behaviour). This attack is detected by Property
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C, although Property C needs to be located outside the
function call so as to check the value of grantAccess
after the function return (or more precisely the returned
value that corresponds to grantAccess).
These attacks illustrate that the process and imple-
mentation here are not limited to a single fault model
or kind of fault injection attack. Thus, the same process
and implementation can be used for a variety of fault
models and fault injection attacks, as long as some
consideration is taken to choose the right properties.
Further, the process and implementation here can detect
fault injection attacks that cannot be found by checking
the source code or intermediate representation alone;
the executable binary must be part of the process and
implementation.
B. Computational Data
This section discusses the experimental results of
automating the the process and implementation of this
paper. This automation is straightforward once all the
tools are available.
To support the automation experiments, a simple fault
injection tool was created2. This tool takes an executable
binary, and produces mutant binaries by replacing one
byte with 0. This fault injection model is naive, but
simple to implement and conduct experiments with to
test the automation of the process and implementation.
To estimate the feasibility of finding arbitrary fault
injection vulnerabilities in a executable, the following
experiment was conducted. A script was written3 that
takes a source code and properties written in C, and
compiles these to an executable binary with GCC. This
executable binary is then validated to ensure the proper-
ties hold. The fault injection tool was used to generate
mutant binaries for each possible byte in the executable
binary being set to 0. The script then enters into a loop
over the mutant binaries that generates the LLVM-IR
for the mutant binary and model checks the properties
on this LLVM-IR. The result of this model checking is
then used to determine if the injected fault found a fault
injection vulnerability. The runtime and number of fault
injection vulnerabilities was counted and reported at the
end of the experiment.
This script was run over a version of the motivat-
ing example (from Section II). The fault injection tool
was limited to injecting faults into the .text area of
the executable binary that corresponds to the compiled
source code (to reduce time wasted model checking fault
2The code for this tool is available upon request.
3This script is available upon request.
injection vulnerabilities in the header or other unrelated
parts of the executable binary).
The executable binary produced by GCC in this case
was 3024 bytes. The .text area was 159 bytes and
thus 159 1-byte fault injection attacks were simulated,
yielding 159 mutant binaries. The following experiments
were conducted on a virtual machine configured with
one CPU, and 7662 MB of RAM running Linux Ubuntu
14.04 LTS. The virtual machine was hosted on a Mac-
book Pro with 3,1 GHz Intel Core i7 processor, 16 GB
of RAM, running OS X EL Capitan 10.11.
Three different experiments were conducted, testing
the three different properties presented earlier. The first
experiment with Property A detected 36 fault injection
vulnerabilities, and had a runtime of 7 minutes. The
second experiment with Property B detected 37 fault in-
jection vulnerabilities, and had runtime of approximately
1 hour. The third experiment with Property C detected
37 fault injection vulnerabilities, and had a runtime of
approximately 2 hours. The main cost in time was the
model checking by LLBMC, as is clearly shown by the
significant difference made by the choice of property.
Observe that the number of fault inject attacks to
test in this manner is linear in the size of the binary
executable. Thus, automatically testing all such fault
injection attacks is feasible, particularly since the im-
plementation can be easily run in parallel.
VII. CASE STUDY: PRESENT
This section presents a case study of five different fault
injection attacks against the PRESENT algorithm.
A. Experimental Design
All the experiments tested a single property to capture
the capability of a fault injection attack to bypass the
encryption algorithm. The property checked whether the
“ciphertext” at the end of the encryption was different
to the “plaintext”. Thus, violations of this property
indicated the encryption algorithm had been effectively
bypassed. The result of each fault injected mutant binary
were thus classified into one of: passed where model
checking passed; infinite loop when the fault caused
an infinite loop; crashed when the fault caused the
program to crash; and vulnerable when the fault caused
the property to be violated.
The five fault models are: modifying an unconditional
jump (JMP) to jump to a new address; modifying a
conditional jump (JBE) to jump to a new address; zero
1 byte (Z1B) that sets a single byte to zero; zero 2
bytes (Z2B) that sets two consecutive bytes to zero; and
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NOP’ing an instruction (NOP) that sets a byte to a non-
operation code. Each is detailed below when considering
the results for that fault model.
B. Results Overview
An overview of the results for injecting these fault
models in all possible locations in the PRESENT binary
can be seen in Table I. All the fault models tested caused
crashes, with these being most common with the zero 2
byte and NOP code 1 byte fault models. Infinite loops
were also quite common, either through modification
of jumps, damaging iterator code, or damaging condi-
tionals. Vulnerabilities were quite rare, which was as
expected, with all arising from the jump fault models.
The rest of this section considers each of the fault models
and the associated experimental results in detail.
Fault Model Colour
Result JMP JBE Z1B Z2B NOP
Passed 1632 502 905 855 784
Infinite Loop 106 0 53 49 93
Crashed 62 60 172 225 248
Vulnerable 1 8 0 0 0
TABLE I: Overview of Fault Injection Results.
C. Unconditional Jump
The fault model for this experiment was to identify
unconditional jump instructions and change their target.
For simplicity only increasing the value of the target
address was considered (i.e. jumping relatively forward,
not relatively backwards). Column JMP of Table I
presents aggregate results. There are 10 unconditional
jumps in the PRESENT binary at addresses 0x0120,
0x014B, 0x0155, 0x018C, 0x01D3, 0x0207, 0x02D4,
0x0313, 0x0361, and 0x0447. The only jump that yielded
a vulnerability was at 0x014B, and the details are shown
in Figure 6 showing the offsets that could be jumped to
and the result of checking each mutant (and the blue box
indicating the end of the experiment range).
Most of the significant changes here were infinite
loops, with a significant number of crashes, and a
single vulnerability that skipped the entire encryption
algorithm. The infinite loops are largely as expected,
since the modified jump can easily skip loop iterator
increment code. The crashes are also to be expected,
mostly related to jumping to incorrect byte offsets for
the instructions, and so yielding invalid instructions (or
instructions that crash in other ways such as trying to
read invalid memory segments). The single vulnerability
was when the jump for the first loop of the encryption
algorithm skips over the entire encryption, going straight
to the end of the code. Only a single instance was found
as most jumps were “short” (single byte offset), meaning
they could not bypass significant amounts of code.
”To Offset Starting 0x0150”
Fig. 6: Unconditional Jumps from Jump at 0x014B
D. Conditional Jump
The conditional jump fault model is very similar to the
unconditional jump fault model, changing conditional
jump targets in the same manner. Column JBE of Table I
presents the summaries for the two conditional jumps
at addresses 0x02C9 and 0x043C. Again vulnerabilities
were only found in one at 0x043C and these are detailed
in Figure 7.
Here no infinite loops were detected likely due to the
conditions always being triggered at least once, instead
only crashes where the unconditional jumps were instead
targeting bad locations in the code leading to incorrect
“instructions”. More interesting are the vulnerabilities
that fall into two groups. The first group (the first three in
the map) jumped to later assignment instructions (includ-
ing incorrectly offset locations) that ended up bypassing
the correct loop controls (by changing values used for
later loop control flow), and eventually skipping the
encryption algorithm. The second group (the remaining
five) simply jumped to the end of the encryption code,
merely bypassing the encryption algorithm.
E. Zero 1 Byte
Another fault model to test automating the process
over a larger number of mutants was to set a single
byte to zero. There are 1130 bytes in the PRESENT
executable binary, and each was set to zero in a different
mutant, yielding the results shown in the Z1B column
of Table I. Detailed results showing which faulted bytes
yield which effect can be seen in the map in Figure 8.
”To Offset Starting 0x043E”
Fig. 7: Conditional Jumps from Jump at 0x043C
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Fig. 8: Zero 1 Byte Fig. 9: Zero 2 Bytes Fig. 10: NOP 1 Byte
No fault injection vulnerabilities to this fault model
were detected, although many crashes and infinite loops
were introduced. This is not a surprising result, since
the PRESENT source code has two top-level loops that
both perform some part of the encryption. Thus, although
setting one byte to zero could skip either one of these,
it would require two (non-consecutive) zero one byte
fault injection attacks to be “vulnerable” according to
the property tested here.
F. Zero 2 Bytes
A similar test of automation over many mutants was
the fault model that sets two consecutive bytes to zero.
There are 1129 possible mutant binaries under this fault
model. Their results shown in the Z2B column of Table I,
and the map showing the starting index of the two bytes
is shown in Figure 9.
Similar to the zero 1 byte fault injection model, no
vulnerabilities were detected. Even more crashes were
introduced, although a few less infinite loops. Generally
this is due to instructions being damaged to yield failure,
either by being simply incomprehensible, or by pushing
memory access outside acceptable bounds.
G. NOP Code 1 Byte
The last fault model for this experiment was to set
each byte to the instruction code for a non-operation
(NOP). This fault injection attack was applied to each
of the 1130 bytes to ensure complete coverage (and
so in some cases had effects other than NOP’ing an
instruction). Column NOP of Table I summarises these
results, with the detailed map in Figure 10.
This approach turned out to be even more destructive
than either of the zero byte fault models. Although more
crashes were introduced, the almost doubling of infinite
loops was an expected result that could be investigated
further in future. No vulnerabilities were detected here
which aligns with the prior results that binaries are fairly
resistant to these kinds of byte attacks.
H. A Note on Scalability
The experiments were conducted on a variety of
devices with different hardware and configurations (all
were virtual machines running Ubuntu X64). The dis-
tribution was due to different experiments being run at
different times, however this makes it impossible to pro-
vide consistent runtime information for the experiments.
That said, in general the model checking (either ver-
ification or checking) was by far the most expensive
in terms of runtime. No attempt was made to optimise
or modify the settings of LLBMC to improve runtime,
despite some results taking many minutes. This is due to
the process being trivially parallisable, since each mutant
can be checked independently.
VIII. RELATED WORK
This section discusses related work and their differ-
ences with respect to the process presented here.
One of the first uses of formal methods to analyse fault
injection vulnerabilities was to verify a counter measure
in the implementation of CRT-RSA by analysing the
C source code [9]. The authors show that by adding
ANSI/ISO C Specification Language (ACSL) [21] prop-
erties to the CRT-RSA pseudocode, they could verify
that the Vigilant’s CRT-RSA countermeasure sufficiently
protects against fault injection attacks. The lack of fault
injection and analysis on the binary limits the attacks
that can be detected to those that have a representation
in the source code. Further, the analysis was only for a
single countermeasure to prove it worked, rather than to
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consider all possible fault injection attacks and models
as is the goal of the process presented here.
Perhaps the closest to the process presented here is
the Symbolic Program Level Fault Injection and Error
Detection Framework (SymPLFIED) [22] a program-
level framework to identify potential vulnerabilities in
a software. The vulnerabilities are detected by combin-
ing symbolic execution and model checking techniques.
However, the SymPLFIED framework is limited as Sym-
PLFIED only supports the MIPS architecture [23]. One
of the proposed future work in [24] was building front-
end to support X86 architecture, but to the best of
our knowledge, no further work has been published on
supporting new architectures in SymPLFIED.
In [25], Potet et al. present Lazart, a tool that can
simulate a variety of fault injection attacks and detect
vulnerabilities using formal methods. The Lazart process
begins with the source code which is compiled to LLVM-
IR. The simulated fault is created by modifying the
control flow of the LLVM-IR. Symbolic execution is then
used to detect differences in the control flow, and thus
detect vulnerabilities. Although this high level approach
is similar to that of this paper, Lazart is unable to reason
about or detect fault injection attacks that operate on
binaries rather than the LLVM-IR. Further, the choice of
symbolic execution does not account for concrete values,
and so is less complete than model checking [26], [27].
In [11] the authors propose combining the Lazart
process with the Embedded Fault Simulator (EFS) [28].
This extends from the capabilities of Lazart alone by
adding lower level fault injection analysis that is also
embedded in the chip with the program. The simula-
tion of the fault is performed in the hardware, so the
semantics of the executed program correspond to the
real execution of the program. However, EFS is limited
to only considering instruction skip faults (equivalent to
NOPs of Section VII-G).
An entirely low level approach is taken by Moro et
al. [10] who use model checking to formally prove the
correctness of their proposed software countermeasures
schemes against fault injection attacks. The approach
has some similarities to here: using model checking
while focusing on low level representations. However,
the focus is on a very specific and limited fault injection
model that causes instruction skips and ignores other
kinds of attacks. Further, the model checking is over
only limited fragments of the assembly code, and not
the program as a whole.
A less formal approach is taken in [29] where exper-
iments are used for testing the TTP/C protocol in the
presence of faults. Rather than attempting to find fault
injection attacks, they injected faults to test robustness
of the protocol. They combined both hardware testing
and software simulation testing, comparing the results
as validation of their approach.
A fault model inference focused approach is taken
by Dureuil et al. [30]. They fix a hardware model and
then test various fault injection attacks based upon this
hardware model. Fault detection is limited to EEPROM
faults on the ARMv7-M architecture. The fault model
is then inferred from the parameters of the attack and
the embedded program. The faults are simulated upon
the assembly code and the results checked with prede-
fined oracles on the embedded program. Although the
approach uses neither formal methods nor general fault
models, the choice of fault model and derivation of this
provides some interesting guidance for selecting fault
models and future work.
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Fault injection has recently been increasingly used
to attack software applications, and test system robust-
ness. This paper presents a formal process that uses
model checking to detect fault injection vulnerabilities
in binaries. This process supports the detection of many
varieties of fault injection vulnerabilities, and does not
rely on any particular system architecture, fault model, or
other restricted choices (as are common in the literature).
Experimental results demonstrate the efficacy or the
process by testing a variety of fault models on the
PRESENT binary. For naive fault models the (zero 1
byte, zero 2 consecutive bytes, NOP code 1 byte) this
yielded many infinite loops and program crashes, but no
attacks to skip the entire algorithm. However, when (both
unconditional and conditional) jump instructions were
targeted, 9 fault injection vulnerabilities were found that
allow complete bypassing of the PRESENT algorithm.
A. Future Work
There are several limitations with the implementa-
tion chosen here that provide opportunities for future
research. Indeed the implementation used was merely the
easiest to combine effectively to implement the process.
The choice to use MC-Sema was to be able to work
with LLVM-IR. The choice of LLVM-IR is due to this
being a widely used intermediate representation that
is supported by many other tools. However, there are
limitations with MC-Sema that may limit future work
with the implementation used in this paper. MC-Sema
supports only (some of) the X86 architecture [18] and
so future work is to replace MC-Sema and/or expand to
implement the process for other architectures.
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The LLBMC model checker is sufficient for the safety
properties but does not support liveness properties. Thus
although LLBMC was sufficient for the proof of concept
here, future work will exploit a non-bounded model
checker that can also accept liveness properties. In partic-
ular a model checker that can produce traces (LLBMC
can, but not combined with MC-Sema) would aide in
understanding vulnerabilities and analysing results.
Fault injection was implemented with custom tools for
this work, although there already exist several tools to
simulate fault injection attacks on software [31], [32].
However, these tools are limited by various choices
that make unsuitable for the process here (hence their
lack of use in the implementation). Several are only
able to inject faults into intermediate representations,
and not into executable binaries [33], [25], [34], thus
being unable to simulate faults that appear only at the
executable binary level. Others have different limitations,
such as: specific hardware platforms [22], [35], spe-
cific source code languages [36], [9], [34], or requiring
simulating drivers [37]. Despite these limitations, many
include useful techniques or developments that could be
incorporated into future development of a general fault
injection tool for executable binaries.
Complementary research is to explore ways to inject
faults intelligently. This could exploit knowledge of the
property to inject faults that would lead to property
violations, yielding improved efficiency of experiments.
Regarding properties, another area of future work is to
consider how to extract properties automatically from the
binary (or source code). There is some existing work in
this area [38], [39] although they focus upon high level
behaviour rather than binary code.
Currently the process identifies vulnerabilities, but
does not suggest fixes or countermeasures. Automati-
cally generating countermeasures is non-trivial, although
if countermeasures to particular faults are known future
work could suggest or implement them automatically.
Perhaps more significantly, these countermeasures could
be checked immediately using the process here and so
their effectiveness verified immediately.
There are also several directions related to case
studies. The analysis of PRESENT here was proof-of-
concept to demonstrate the process, and indeed some of
the “passed” results here correspond to known differen-
tial attacks against PRESENT [40], [41]. Applying the
process with more properties to consider, and a better
suite of fault models would yield more complete results
on the vulnerability of the PRESENT binary.
Future case studies could consider other security criti-
cal software, e.g. encryption algorithms, mission critical
software, embedded device kernels, and also software
that has implemented countermeasures.
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